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0. Introduction
One of the tasks required to understand narrative discourse is ordering events
described by the sentences in the narrative. Previous research has claimed that at
least three factors affect the way the order of events is determined. One of these
factors is the “anaphoricity” of tense, which means that the tense of a sentence
refers back to the time just after the event described by the previous sentence, or
that it refers back to the time at which the state that is described by the previous
sentence holds. This view was first proposed by Partee (1973) and further devel-
oped in Partee (1984). To illustrate, consider (1).
(1) Sheila had a party last Friday and Sam got drunk.
Partee argues that most uses of tenses are referential. In the second sentence in 
(1), the past tense does not refer back to any random time before the time of 
utterance. Rather, it refers back specifically to the vicinity of the time in which the 
state that is described by the previous clause holds. This analysis, which posits 
that tenses refer back to some other time that is given by previous event and state 
descriptions, is the main gist of models of discourse interpretation that make use 
of the notion of temporal anaphora. Discourse interpretation models such as 
Discourse Representation Theory have made use of the notion of temporal 
anaphora in explaining the temporal relationship of events and states in narrative 
discourse (Kamp & Reyle 1993). Through temporal anaphoricity, the temporal 
ordering of events is established. 
Another possible factor that affects the interpretation of event order is world 
knowledge. Speakers usually have knowledge of how the world operates and 
functions; i.e., they know that certain events tend to trigger other events, e.g., an 
event involving a barking dog may be followed by an event of a running cat. 
Speakers usually have knowledge of the cause-and-effect relations that hold 
between different events in real life. Speakers may use this world knowledge to 
determine the temporal order of events described by sequences of sentences. To 
illustrate, consider (2) and (3). 
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(2)  The baby cried. Bill pinched him. 
(3)  The baby cried. Bill consoled him. 
 
Most speakers would assume that pinching a baby would most probably cause 
the baby to cry and infer a cause-and-effect relation between the two events. And 
speakers would also reason that causes happen before their intended effects, 
therefore, in (2), the event described by the second sentence occurs before the 
event described by the first sentence, resulting in an event ordering that is the 
reverse of the sentences’ order. On the other hand, a crying event could also 
probably trigger a consoling event. Therefore, in (3), based on one’s knowledge 
of the world, the event described by the first sentence would be interpreted as 
happening before the event described by the second sentence. 
A third factor that influences the temporal interpretation of narrative dis-
courses is the presentational order of sentences. For example, consider the dis-
courses in (4) and (5). 
 
(4)  John and Mary got married. Mary moved into John’s house. 
(5)  Mary moved into John’s house. John and Mary got married. 
 
In both examples, there is a tendency to interpret the sequence of events as 
identical to the order in which they are presented. In other words, the first sen-
tence corresponds to the first event, and the second sentence corresponds to the 
second event. Thus, the order of presentation matters, since the temporal ordering 
of the two events differs as a function of the order of presentation. In this study, 
discourse which receives a temporal interpretation identical to the order of 
presentation will be labeled as “canonical order” discourse, while those which 
receive a temporal interpretation in which the order of presentation and event 
order do not match will be labeled as “non-canonical order” discourse. If a 
language does not have tense, it may be the case that non-canonical order is more 
frequent than in tensed languages, since the second sentence’s temporal interpre-
tation is not tied to the first sentence’s temporal interpretation via a DRT-style 
interpretation of tense. Lack of tense may result in a less frequent iconic interpre-
tation of events in discourse. 
The lack of tense may also cause other factors such as aspect marking to have 
a larger role in the temporal interpretation of discourse. Aspect refers to the 
“different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation,” as 
defined in Comrie (1976). Aspect marking can signal whether an event is on-
going (progressive), completed (perfective), or about to occur (prospective). The 
fact that a sentence marks the described situation’s aspect can also be a source of 
information when locating a certain event in time. 
This study aims to see what the factors are that affect temporal interpretation 
if a language lacks tense, and therefore notions of temporal anaphoricity are not 
applicable. I investigate how other factors such as world knowledge, presenta-
tional order of sentences, and aspect marking contribute to the task of the tempo-
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ral interpretation of narrative discourse, and try to present a model of other 
elements that come into play if tense is unavailable as a resource for temporal 
interpretation. It is hypothesized that in a tenseless language, aspect markers can 
act as sources of temporal information without invoking anaphoricity per se. It is 
also hypothesized that the available factors in a tenseless language do not contrib-
ute equally to the task of temporal interpretation. Specifically, it is hypothesized 
that in a tenseless language, world knowledge may play a larger role in determin-
ing how events are ordered with respect to each other, due to the fact that lack of 
tense blocks a temporal interpretation as posited by Discourse Representation 
Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993:497). To test these hypotheses regarding temporal 
interpretation in a tenseless language, I conducted an experiment on Tagalog, a 
tenseless language, which manipulated three factors: aspect marking, presenta-
tional order, and world knowledge. 
 
1. Experiment 
The experiment consisted of a norming study conducted with English speakers, 
and a main experiment conducted with Tagalog speakers. 
 
1.1. Norming Study 
Prior to conducting an experiment with Tagalog speakers, a norming study was 
conducted with English speakers, in order to determine the event-order bias of the 
stimulus sets. The norming study measured the likelihood of events happening 
before or after another event. It was conducted with English speakers, while the 
experiment was conducted with Tagalog speakers, assuming that the relevant 
portions of the world in an English-speaking area behave similarly to correspond-
ing portions of the world in a Tagalog-speaking area. 
For the norming study, participants evaluated the likelihood that one event 
will happen before or after another event in a two-event discourse. For example, 
in (6), one set of participants were asked to rate the likelihood that the event 
described in the sentence Bill pushed John preceded the event described in the 
sentence John fell, while another set of participants were asked to rate the likeli-
hood that the event described in the sentence John fell preceded the event de-
scribed in the sentence Bill pushed John. This was done in order to classify 
stimuli as to whether they had a preferred order of interpretation or not. 
 
(6)  Bill pushed John. John fell. 
(7)  John fell. Bill pushed John. 
(8) John sliced the pizza. Mary poured the drinks. 
(9)  Mary poured the drinks. John sliced the pizza. 
 
A total of 154 test items were constructed. Each of these test items consisted 
of two sentences, marked A and B. Each of the 154 test items had two versions as 
all test items were presented in canonical and non-canonical order. “Canonical 
order” here refers to stimuli in which the event that has a high probability of 
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occurring first is described in the first sentence, as in (6), while “non-canonical 
order” refers to stimuli in which the event that has a high probability of occurring 
first is described in the second sentence, as in (7). Half of the stimuli were pre-
dicted to involve a preferred order of interpretation, such as (6) and (7), while the 
other half of the stimuli were predicted to have no preferred order of interpreta-
tion, such as (8) and (9). 
The norming study consisted of two lists each: 24 participants rating the like-
lihood of the event described in the first sentence as happening before the event 
that is described in the second sentence, with test items presented in canonical and 
non-canonical order; and 24 participants rating the likelihood of the event de-
scribed in the second sentence as happening before the event that is described in 
the first sentence, again with test items presented in canonical and non-canonical 
order. 
The participants rated the likelihood of the sequences of events using a 7-point 
scale. Half of the participants rated how likely it is that the event described in the 
first sentence happens before the event described in the second sentence, by 
ranking the likelihood on a scale between 1 to 7, 1 being highly likely, and 7 
being highly unlikely. The other half of the participants on the other hand rated 
how likely it is that the event described in the second sentence happens before the 
event described in the first sentence. The norming procedure was done this way in 
order to see whether there is symmetry in the preferred order of interpretation: if a 
stimuli with a high event-order bias has the probable cause appearing in the first 
sentence, then participants would rate it highly likely that the event described in 
the first sentence occurs before the event described by the second sentence. 
Likewise, the other participants would then rate it highly unlikely that the event 
described in the second sentence occurs before the event described by the first 
sentence. This mirror-effect is not predicted to occur in stimuli that have a low 
event-order bias, since those stimuli consist of events that are plausible in either 
order. 
Based on the results of the norming data, a total of 96 stimuli were chosen for 
the Tagalog experiment. 48 of these were deemed to have a high probability of 
one described event to occur before the other (having a high event-order bias), 
while the other 48 were deemed to have no preference for one event occurring 
before the other (having a low event-order bias). These stimuli were then trans-
lated into Tagalog. 
 
1.2. Tagalog Experiment 
The Tagalog experiment had three experimental factors: perfective or prospective 
aspect marking on each verb in a pair of sentences; canonical or non-canonical 
presentational order; and high or low event-order bias. Only the first two factors 
listed above were crossed within items, resulting in a stimulus set in which half of 
the items consisted of two-sentence discourse items that had a high event-order 
bias, and the other half of the items consisted of two-sentence discourse items that 
had a low event-order bias.  
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Aspect marking was crossed with two possible (canonical or non-canonical) 
presentational orders. In high event-order bias stimuli, the event that is likely to 
happen first is described in the first sentence for canonically ordered stimuli, but it 
is described in the second sentence for non-canonically ordered stimuli. In low 
event-order bias stimuli, variation or presentational order is irrelevant due to the 
fact that there is no preferred order of the events in the discourse. 
In total, each of the 96 stimuli had 8 different versions, depending on the two 
verbs’ aspectual combination and what order the sentences were presented in. The 
aspectual marking combinations were fully crossed with presentational order. 
Eight lists of 96 sentence pairs were created, each list with only one version of 
each 8 stimulus pairs. Each of the 72 native Tagalog participants was assigned to 
one of the lists and only saw one version of any given stimulus pair. 
Each list had between 8 and 10 participants. Participants were instructed to 
diagram the possible interpretations of the different stimulus pairs by placing the 
events on a time line. For each stimulus pair, they were given diagrams as in (10).  
 
(10) ----------|----------   ----------|---------- 
  N     N 
 
Participants were asked to say in what order they thought the events described 
in the sentence pair occurred by drawing vertical lines corresponding to the events 
described by the sentences, either before or after the vertical line for N (signifying 
the time of utterance NOW). They were given clear examples of the procedure.  
If they interpret the first sentence as happening before the second sentence, 
then they would put A before B on the timeline. If they interpret the first sentence 
as happening after the second sentence, they would put B before A on the timeline. 
Participants were also asked to diagram where the two events are located with 
respect to the time of utterance. Participants thus had to make three independent 
judgments: 1) the order of the event described in the first sentence with respect to 
the time of utterance; 2) the order of the event described in the second sentence 
with respect to the time of utterance; and 3) the order of the events described in 
the first and second sentences with respect to each other. 
It is worth pointing out that participants had the option to indicate multiple 
possible interpretations for any given stimulus. Thus, if the stimulus allowed for 
more than one possible interpretation, they were told to indicate alternative 
interpretations as well. Participants also had the option to indicate ungrammatical-
ity or infelicity for any given stimulus. If they judged a stimulus as wrong or 
uninterpretable in any way, there was a way for them to indicate it. All the 
participants’ answers were then summed up, based on the type of stimulus and the 
participants’ judgments. 
 
2. Results and Discussion 
Even though there is no tense marker in Tagalog, aspect markers receive default 
temporal interpretation. In other words, sentences that are marked with the 
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perfective are more likely to be interpreted as describing events that precede 
utterance time than sentences that are marked by the prospective. Conversely, 
sentences that are marked with the prospective are more likely to be interpreted as 
describing events that follow utterance time (Langacker 1991). This is what is 
suggested by the results of a binary logistic regression analysis, with aspect of the 
first sentence (A), aspect of the second sentence (B), presentational order, and 
event-order bias as predictors. When regressing for the relationship of the event in 
the first sentence (A) with respect to utterance time (N), the aspect marking of the 
first sentence emerged as the most important predictor, followed by the aspect of 
the second sentence, and then presentational order. Event-order bias was found to 
be non-significant in predicting this relationship, as can be seen in Table 11. 
Running a similar test to predict the relationship of the event in the second 
sentence (B) with respect to utterance time (N) produced similar results, in which 
the aspect marking of the second sentence was the most important predictor in 
this relationship. Details can be seen in Table 12. 
 
(11) Relationship of First Sentence to Utterance Time 
 
 ȕ S.E. Wald’s Ȥ2 df p eȕ 
Aspect of A -4.490 0.084 2860.126 1 0.0001 0.011 
Aspect of B -0.761 0.077 96.704 1 0.0001 0.467 
Event-Order Bias -0.092 0.077 1.425 1 0.233 0.913 
Presentation Order 0.354 0.077 21.430 1 0.0001 1.425 
Constant 3.009 0.096 982.850 1 0.0001 20.274 
  
(12) Relationship of Second Sentence to Utterance Time 
 
 ȕ S.E. Wald’s Ȥ2 df p eȕ 
Aspect of A -0.921 0.075 152.070 1 0.0001 0.398 
Aspect of B -4.218 0.079 2839.351 1 0.0001 0.015 
Event-Order Bias -0.054 0.073 0.545 1 0.46 0.947 
Presentation Order -0.727 0.075 94.247 1 0.0001 0.484 
Constant 3.330 0.096 1193.757 1 0.0001 27.933 
 
The next question to ask is whether world knowledge indeed plays a role in 
the temporal ordering of sentences in tenseless languages. A binary logistic 
regression analysis was conducted, with aspect of the first sentence (A), aspect of 
the second sentence (B), and presentational order as predictors. The data was 
separated into high and low event-order bias stimuli, and it turned out that the 
effect of the different predictors varies on whether the stimulus has a high or low 
event-order bias. 
For responses to low event-order bias stimuli, both aspects of A and B equally 
contribute to predicting the temporal relationship of both events. Presentational 
order on the other hand is non-significant. This is seen in Table 13. This shows 
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that whenever the stimulus pairs have low event-order bias, in other words, if the 
events that are described by the two sentences are not likely to happen in one 
particular order, then the two factors that have most influence in predicting the 
temporal relationship of the two events are the aspect marking of both sentences, 
as shown by the high Wald statistics for the two aforementioned factors. 
 
(13) Relationship of First Event to Second Event (Low Event-Order Bias) 
 
Low Event-Order Bias ȕ S.E. Wald’s Ȥ2 df p eȕ 
Aspect of A -1.942 0.082 554.399 1 0.0001 0.143 
Aspect of B 1.955 0.082 563.091 1 0.0001 7.063 
Presentation Order -0.095 0.072 1.724 1 0.189 0.910 
Constant 0.378 0.066 32.864 1 0.0001 0.685 
 
(14) Relationship of First Event to Second Event (High Event-Order Bias) 
 
High Event-Order Bias ȕ S.E. Wald’s Ȥ2 df p eȕ 
Aspect of A -1.912 0.128 222.997 1 0.0001 0.148 
Aspect of B 1.851 0.126 215.072 1 0.0001 6.368 
Presentation Order 4.606 0.142 1045.670 1 0.0001 100.105 
Constant -2.184 0.119 337.413 1 0.0001 0.113 
 
On the other hand, for responses to high event-order bias stimuli, presenta-
tional order is the most important predictor, followed by the aspect values of both 
A and B. In other words, the significance of the various predictors change, 
depending on whether the stimuli are high or low event-order bias discourses (c.f. 
Table 14). Thus, event-order bias determines how important each of the other 
predictors is in establishing the temporal relationship of the two events in the 
discourse. If a narrative discourse has a low event-order bias, the most important 
source of temporal interpretation is the aspect marking on the verbs in both 
sentences. However, if the narrative discourse has a high event-order bias, then 
aspect marking takes on a smaller role in temporal interpretation. Instead, world 
knowledge matters more and therefore is the major factor in interpreting the 
relationship of the two sentences. For high event-order bias stimuli, the Wald 
statistic for the aspect marking of the two sentences are not as high as the low 
event-order bias stimuli. Instead, presentational order receives a high Wald statistic, 
suggesting that speakers tap on to their knowledge of the world and use this knowl-
edge to interpret the discourse’s temporal relationship based on that information. 
If a stimulus pair has a low event-order bias, then the only cue that influences 
the temporal relation between events described by the first and second sentence 
are their aspect markings. However, if a stimulus pair has a high event-order bias, 
then speakers would compute the probability of the two events happening with 
respect to each other and interpret events that are probable causes as happening 
before events that are probable effects, regardless of which event is presented first. 
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For stimuli that have a low event-order bias, ordering does not produce a differ-
ence in interpretation, due to the fact that neither of the two events has a high 
probability of occurring before the other event. However, for high event-order 
bias stimuli, one of the two events has a high probability of occurring before the 
other, since it may be a probable cause of the other event. If the probable cause is 
presented as the first sentence, then the stimuli is presented in the canonical order. 
On the other hand, if the probable cause is presented by the second sentence, then 
the stimuli is presented in the non-canonical order. Therefore, if the stimuli were 
presented in the non-canonical order, speakers used their world knowledge to aid 
in the temporal interpretation and interpreted the second sentence as preceding the 
first sentence. 
 
3. Theoretical Implications 
3.1. Temporal Anaphoricity 
Kamp and Reyle (1993) argue that temporal interpretation involves anaphoricity 
in tensed languages. This means that the temporal interpretation of events de-
scribed by sentences is partly influenced by the context in which these sentences 
occur. They provide as examples the sentences in (15) and (16). 
 
(15)  Last week Fred bought his ninth cat. He paid 75 ECU for it. 
(16)  Bill left the house at a quarter past five. He took a taxi to the station and 
caught the first train to Bognor. 
 
They argue that the second sentences in these two discourses are interpreted as 
describing events that occurred in the vicinity of the event described in the first 
sentence. According to their model, the interpretation of events and states that are 
described by the subsequent sentences are dependent on the events or states that are 
described by the previous sentences. A subsequent state overlaps with the time of 
the previous event or state, while a subsequent event, as seen in examples (15) and 
(16), is interpreted as occurring in a certain time, which is in turn interpreted as 
occurring after the time of the preceding events or states. In other words, without 
the use of explicit temporal adverbials, time always moves forward in this analysis. 
However, the analysis of Kamp and Reyle is not directly applicable to Tagalog, 
since the language has no tense in the first place. In fact, it is not true in the case of 
Tagalog that the event described by the second sentence refers back to the time of 
the event described by the first sentence. This is illustrated in the example in (17): 
 
(17) Na-tumba  si       Juan. T<in>ulak      ni        Bill  si       Juan. 
 PERF-fall SUBJ John  <PERF>push NSUB Bill SUBJ John 
 ‘John fell. Bill pushed John.’ 
 
In the Tagalog example in (17), it is most likely that the event described in the 
second sentence is interpreted as happening before the event described in the first 
sentence. This runs contrary to Kamp and Reyle’s analysis. The net effect of 
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Kamp and Reyle’s view is that the temporal interpretation of discourse is iconic; 
time always moves forward. Unless there is an explicit signal that the temporal 
order of the described events is reversed, the second sentence is interpreted as 
following the first sentence, and the third sentence is interpreted as following the 
second, and so on. This prediction is not supported by the experimental data from 
Tagalog, however. 
If it were true that temporal interpretation is dependent on anaphoricity, then it 
should be the case that the event that the second sentence describes is always 
interpreted as occurring after the event that the first sentence describes. However, 
we saw that the interpretation of the temporal relationship between A and B is 
dependent on other factors aside from presentational order. These other factors 
include event-order bias, and the aspect marking of the individual sentences 
themselves. It cannot be argued that anaphoricity effects are still present in an 
otherwise tenseless language, due to the fact that not all stimuli are interpreted in 
a canonical order; non-canonical interpretation is possible, which is triggered by 
the other factors mentioned above. 
As explained earlier, speakers use their knowledge of the world to evaluate 
the relationship of two events in a discourse. For low event-order bias stimulus 
pairs, the most important factors in temporal interpretation are the aspect marking 
of both sentences. For high event-order bias stimulus pairs on the other hand, the 
speakers’ knowledge of the world is the most important factor in temporal inter-
pretation, since depending on which order a given stimulus is presented in, the 
speakers will evaluate differently how the two events are related, i.e., probable 
causes will be interpreted as happening before probable effects. Thus, world 
knowledge plays a factor in temporal interpretation as well, overriding the infor-
mation given by aspect marking. 
Therefore, it is not true that anaphoricity always plays a role in the temporal 
interpretation of ordered sentences. If anaphoricity was the main component in 
temporal interpretation, then there would be no cases of non-canonical interpreta-
tion of discourse. Regardless as to whether the stimuli has a high or low event-
order bias, the second sentence would always be interpreted as occurring after the 
first sentence, since the interpretation of the second sentence is dependent on the 
first. However that is not always the case. Instead, what we can see here is that 
world knowledge plays the most important role in the temporal ordering of 
sentences for tenseless languages, a fact that contradicts the anaphoricity hypothe-
sis. If world knowledge does not provide cues, as in the case of low event-order 
bias pairs, then it is aspect markers that are present in the sentences and their 
default tense interpretation that are the source of information for temporal inter-
pretation. And if the aspect markers are the same in low event-order bias pairs, 
then the interpretation would be based solely on presentational order; i.e., the 
event described by the first sentence is interpreted as occurring before the event 
described by the second sentence. 
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3.2. The Role of World Knowledge 
It has been claimed early on by Dowty (1986) that temporal interpretation de-
pends on three different factors: 1) a semantic analysis of Aktionsarten using 
interval semantics, as expounded in Dowty (1979); 2) a single principle for the 
interpretation of successive sentences in a discourse, which does not make refer-
ence to Aktionsarten; and 3) Gricean conversational implicatures and “common 
sense” reasoning based on world knowledge. He then presents an interpretation 
principle for temporal discourse, which takes into account the type of Aktionsart 
the predicate has, and the type of (grammatical) aspect that they are marked for. 
Using these pieces of information, he posits the Temporal Discourse Interpreta-
tion Principle (Dowty 1986).  
According to the interpretation principle, it is only possible to have reverse 
temporal interpretation when definite time adverbials are used that would explic-
itly signal reversal of temporal interpretation. Dowty admits that the principle has 
to be modified to explain elaborating narratives and he also mentions that world 
knowledge is essential, but he does not describe how it affects temporal interpre-
tation. 
More recently, numerous scholars have suggested that world knowledge, in the 
form of coherence relations, play a role in ordering events in discourse. A model of 
temporal relations as a by-product of reasoning about coherence relations has been 
put forward in Lascarides and Asher (1993) and Asher and Lascarides (2003). 
Kehler (2002) on the other hand puts forth an account of temporal ordering that 
combines tense information and coherence relations. An important question to ask 
then is to what extent coherence relations influence temporal ordering. 
In the experiment that I conducted, the stimuli were designed so that half of 
them would be high event-order bias stimuli, and the other half low event-order 
bias stimuli. If coherence relations play a part in temporal interpretation, there 
should be an observable difference in how described events are ordered between 
these two groups. 
It was seen that participants were sensitive to world knowledge of cause and 
effect for high event-order bias stimuli. Aspect marking is still significant, but if 
one looks at the Wald statistic for aspect marking on high event-order bias pairs in 
Tables 13 and 14, it is clear that it is not as significant as aspect marking for low 
event-order bias pairs. If sensitivity to the knowledge of probable causes and 
probable effects matters highly for this type of stimuli, it suggests that speakers 
use their world knowledge information to determine what type of coherence 
relation can be established, and then the temporal relation between events. Cru-
cially, this analysis of temporal ordering does not depend on temporal anaphora, 
since reversal of reference time ordering is possible. Theories of temporal anaph-
ora seem irrelevant to handle ordering of events in Tagalog. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that in a tenseless language such as Tagalog, different 
factors influence the temporal interpretation of discourse. A three-factor experi-
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ment was conducted to test and see which factors make a larger contribution to 
the task of temporally ordering events described by pairs of sentences. The results 
of the experiment show that there are more factors that are involved in interpret-
ing the temporal relationships that exist between events. Aside from aspectual 
information that is explicitly marked in the predicates, world knowledge influ-
ences temporal interpretation as well. 
It was shown how world knowledge and coherence relations are only part of 
what determines temporal interpretation. The data support the claim that coher-
ence relations play a role in temporal interpretation. However, it was also pointed 
out that temporal constraints put forth by coherence relations can be overridden, 
as when the information coming from aspect markers contradicts the possible 
coherence relation that can be established between the two events, and when some 
participants ignored the constraints that coherence relations provided. Coherence 
relations most frequently dictate what the available temporal interpretation is, but 
not always. 
In conclusion, the results of the Tagalog experiment suggest that there is a hi-
erarchy of importance of the different factors that influence temporal interpreta-
tion. Lack of tense in Tagalog paved way for other factors to play a role in 
temporal interpretation. Coherence relations constrain the possible temporal 
interpretations of a given discourse, depending on their aspect marking. Finally, if 
coherence relations do not make a prediction, one can assign default tense interpre-
tations to aspect marking, which can be a source of the temporal interpretation as 
well, as long as the coherence relation does not contradict the default interpretation. 
We cannot generalize the findings of this study to other tenseless languages. 
Further experimental research must be done in other tenseless languages to see 
whether the same conclusions attained by examining the Tagalog data hold, since 
the pattern exhibited here may not be true to other tenseless languages. In addition, 
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